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MaTch 1, 1%8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 8199~ 
THE DESIRABILITY OF A RESO-
LUTION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN 
VIETNAM 
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the problem 
of Vietnam and what we should do in 
achieving a decent resolution of our in-
volvement in that wartorn, unhappy 
land is a problem that looms over the 
thinking, the plans, and the aspirations 
of us all. 
There is no Senator amongst us who 
is more familiar and knowledgeable con-
cerning this problem than is the senior 
Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD] , 
whose knowledge of the area and whose 
experience with its people is great. 
The distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana made a singularly perceptive and 
forthright speech at the convocation of 
the University of Ind iana a week ago to-
day. In the course •f that speech, the 
Senator made the fundamental point 
thalr-
Thcrc Is no ohllntlon to con tinue to pour 
out the blood and resourc~s or this Nation 
until South Vlctwun Is made safe for one 
Vlctnamc~e faction or anothrr . 
The Senator also cited the sad statis-
tics when he made his speech a week 
ago that reveal that thPre were 543 young 
American mPn who had been killed in 
the prrceding 7 days. That was the hi['h-
r:;t werkly lola\ of draths In the war. To-
day, only 1 1\'Cck Iuter, we find tha t \\'e 
hnn• 1 e<tchcd the second highest total of 
deaths of the war, 470 deaths have oc-
curred. 'Hlis bri111~s us to a total of 18,709 
young ntPll killed and 115,144 wounded 
in this unhappy war-a total that Is not 
far from the total young men ktlled and 
wounded in the Korean conflict. 
These mounting casualty ftgures of 
the United States alone-figures that do 
not include the young Vietnamese men, 
women, and children that have been and 
are being killed in North and South 
Vietnam-! believe show, stress, and un-
derline the importance of the speech of 
the Senator from Montana and make it 
singularly significant today. 
I call the speech to the attention of 
my colleagues and ask unarlimous con-
sent that it be printed at this point in 
the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the speech 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
ASSESSMENr IN VIETNAM 
(Remarks Of Senator MIK!: MANSFIELD, of 
Montana, at the Indiana University Con-
vocation, Eloomlngton, Ind., F ebruary 23 . 
1968 ) 
The struggle In Vietnam hM turned grim, 
pitiless, and devastating. The casualty llg-
uree are stagge11ng. The physical damage 1s 
enormous. Men, women, children, solcUers, 
guerrillas. weapons. mac.hlnes. cities, towns, 
and v11lages-all are thrown together in an 
inferno of destruction. ' · 
I t Ls not surprising that the situation has 
been interpreted in some quarters as ap• 
proaching some sort or cllmax. It may well 
be, as has been suggested . the beginning of 
the end. The question Is what beginning and 
what end? Peace by millta.ry v1ctory? Peace 
by negotiations? With whom? For what? 
There Ls no certainty at thLs point as to what 
wUJ emerge In Vietnam, or for that matter, 
whether the end of thls war Is to be found in 
Vietnam. 
I have no desire. therefore. to indulge, to-
day, ln what has become a kind or pa.rlor 
game called "Who's wlnnln.g in Vietnam?" It 
is offensive to me. as I know i t must be to 
you. to hear thls deadly conflict treated as 
some sort of athletic contest. The lives of too 
many young Americans are on the line in 
VIetnam. T oo many bewlldered men and 
women and children are being burnt. 
bloodied and broken by tills war . Too much Is 
in ruins. Too many lle dead. Vl~tnam Ls not 
a game. There can be no winners; there are 
only losers and the longer the war perslsls 
the greater n.re the losses f or all concerned. 
The tragedy or Vietnam constrains us all to 
great sobriety In discussion. There Ls llttle 
polnt In speculating on the current ciMhes--
who ls winning and who Is not or what Ls 
belng won a nd what Is n o t . The need ls to 
try to define o.ccurately the chnr11cter of the 
present tr agedy and, ln that way, hopefully, 
to see m ore clea.rly what the interests of this 
n ation will require in the days ahead. 
In tills respect, seldom has a problem pre-
sented greater dlmcultles than Vietnam and 
seldom has the need for a solution been 
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!'renter A rest.orat!on or p!•ac•• !A lmpernll e 
for ~he WPlfare of the people Of Vle~nnm: 
they have been rough~ over for •o long that. 
in the nulllons. they are torn from their 
nncestral places see:kmg refuge where there 
!s no refuge For us. too, an honor.tble solu-
'1 ·n Is of the utmost urgency. The war in 
•·1~ nom has been deeply divisive In it.< ef-
cts on this nation It hns cHverted energy 
r 1d r csources !rom the f."!' en t needs of our 
< wn society. The vast cllfficult!es or the urban 
rea.,, for exnmple, cry out !or att-ention, 
bu~ the cry Is barely heard above the din 
of the dl•t:'lnt conft!ct. 
Tht nation's economic equ!l!br!um Is In 
d:mger or b('!ng thrown out or k!lter by the 
Immense demands of the war I n thl$ con-
nect.ton. we have already suffered a s!gnlfl-
ca.nt degree or lnllat!on. Furthennore, we 
are confronted with what can onlv be c:\llcd 
the embarrassment of having to ·cllscour:\ge 
the travel of Americans abroad, beC:\USe or 
d!f!\cult!cs which the war and other foreign 
commitments h:wc Introduced Into the na-
tion's balance of payments, 
In our relations with the rest or the world, 
the war In V!etnnm hrl..< pla.ced formidable 
blocks in the way or further progress In In-
ternational cooperation. It has brought In 
Its wake new threats to the st..~b!J!ty of peace, 
as In the case of U1e U S.S. Pueblo Incident 
which may be but the precu!'llor or others 
In these pinpoints or !n.<tab111ty, moreover, 
there are ever-present threats to the !nul 
defensfl6 o! the world ll!(alrl.llt nuclear catas-
trophe. 
We did not arrive at this sltu.ltlon over-
night. Our Involvement in VIetnam Is not 
new born. If we are at n cr068J'oa.ds, today, 
It ls but one In a chain o! cro"SJ'oads which 
extends backwards for many years. There 
comes to mind. !or exnmple, the mome•lt o! 
the French collap<e and the Geneva C<>n-
!erences of 1954: the oss38Sinatton or Pres-
Ident Ngo D!nh Diem In 1963 and the rl'-
pla.c-em-ent of civilian government In Saigon 
by a series of unstable reglmee, drawn ever 
more steadily from mlll ta.ry sou ret'S, ever 
more dependent on the United StatPs. 
Finally, there comee to mind the Tonkin BRy 
Incident and the lame-fiCII.Je direct military 
englll(emcnt of the United States theren!ter 
In the war In Vietnam. 
In retrol!peot It is app..,...nt that at oor.h or 
th..,;e C1'06Sroads the AmPrlcn.n military In-
volvement has deepened . It Is aleo apparpnt 
tha.t the BU<X'esslve !ncren.see In millta.ry 
commitment havE' led , so far. not to peac(', 
but rsther to a.n lncroo.'l(' In <">Unkr mil!tnry 
commitment. At the end of 1965, five SenR-
tors Including myself visited V!etnnm In a 
report made public at the oon<'lusion or our 
study. we stntl'd that we had found that 
this naUon's m111tnry ell'ort wM " ... pressing 
ngalnst a mll!ta.ry s!tua.tlon which Is, In ell'ect, 
open ended How open is d('pend<'nt on the 
extent to which North Vletnnm and its sup-
porters nre willing and able to m('('t tncreMed 
force by lncreMed !o~." 
H<"w open the war? How able anrl wtll!ng 
the oppo. !ng fore"<! to moot !ncrensro forc·e 
hy !ncret1S('(! force• 
Our armed forces In V!etnnm have !n-
cren~ed from 23.000 at the beginning o~ 1065 
to more than half a mlll!on today The l>omb-
!ng of North V!,.tnam by air and rea has 
l!'r<>Wn from spoctllc retal!at!on for spcctflc 
VIet Cong n<'ts of olf<'nsc agatn.•t our forces 
into the m 011t systPmnt!c air nnd nnval bom-
bardment since World Wfl.r II. The ton11nge 
of expl08h·es which has fallPn upon VIetnam 
Is alr!'ndy higher than In Kore:•. or, !or that 
m:Lt!Rr, In the entire Pactflc Theatre during 
World War II nnd probaUly clo.qe to tha~ 
unl""'*'<! In Europe. Moreover, one by one, 
the l!m!taUons on bomb!ng-t'l.rg;:-1:4! In North 
V!ctnnm have been removed until a nwr" 
handful Is all that now stands a!(alnst !u-
dlscrlm!na.te destntct!on o! life and property. 
Indeed, the search for an elusive victory hn.s 
led some to clamor for that Indiscriminate 
dPstru~tion, even t•) the point of ret tm!ng 
Vlettnm to the St.one Age 
Wtth l'SC~lat!on has camp m ounting looses 
of life on all sides. U.S. c ISualty lists are 
.llready longer In the first 1\\'l' or six wt>t"ks of 
1968 than they werl' durin,: the ent.lrc year 
of 1965. In all o! 11165, 1 36!1 Americans W<'re 
killed By Februilry 10. ~h1s year. 1.674 Amer-
1 ''1-lls h.td alrea<ly been killed. AccordiJg to 
I'<'P<)rt.< IRSuNI 111 S.tlgon on yesterdn". 543 
ntldll!omll Amer tc.1ns were kllled In the Inst 
seven d ys, the highest weekly total o! thl' 
vdr. Tlw o\'er-all flgmcs now st:tnd at 18,:!39 
dl'ath" and t.he woumh'<l toW 112.469 Among 
Utt• nppo61ng forces, of coul$e, tilcre are re-
P >rts of astrottmical Increases In mo:n killed, 
taken pr!sonN, or dcs~rt.tng. 
I cite thl'.>e gruesn:uc flgur<'., to Indicate 
the !rnmen.<.e gmwW1 In the S<'Ope of ~hi' con-
flict, J>.trt!culnrly as !t. ha., Involved the Uu!tc<l 
Stat s I find 11 mo~t lnappr..pr!nte tha.t this 
effort .• nd the:.c grf''lt K'l<'rltlccs are, tn effect. 
called !nn.ctequate In 11onw qu 1rtcrs. The fact 
Is th t. short of what Prim~ M!ntster W!lson 
has called the "lunacy" of nuclear war, this 
nation hIS llll\de a mu."-1!1<•' military •ll'ort ln 
V!etnnm The effort lla.' l><'<'n mo.de by dedi-
cated A.tuerlcarL,, ably led, who h~ve carried 
out their ord<>rs with couragf' and skill. At 
this lnte date, It ought at least to be clellr 
that If the s!tunt!on In Vtctnrun has not 
changed as anticipated, It hilS not been for 
want or an extraordinary mll!t.ary effort by 
thl" United St-ates AntPrlc:tn forces may well 
have done too much but by no stretch of 
t.be In g!nat!vn C:\n It be s.'\.ld that thPy h11ve 
done to little 
Ne,ertheless. the reality Is that the situa-
tion lu.s not chnn~ !<! as .tnt!c!p:lted. At the 
t.1mc or my last ' sit to V!etnnm In 1965. 
a\all ble estimates .ntllcated that 22 percent 
of the population or South VIetnam hns 
under control of the N1Uon:.I Liberation 
Frmt, GO percent under governm('nt <:o::Jtrol 
and 18 percent cont ted At the end or l~•t 
yea.r, th~ Saigon go,·crnment wa.~ reported AS 
controlling 67 p<'rcPnL or the population, pre-
sum bly a gain o! 7 percent. Sul><;t·tnt!al pro-
gresa wn.s also reported In the so-called 
pact!lc,,tton progrnm which had bPt>n 
des gned to strengthNl and expand S.'\.lgon·s 
con t.rol over the rur~oll nre.'\8. 
Tlwn came the wave or attacks ag.dnst 
the cities or South \ tetnam One con put 
whate\('r 1lterpreta.t!on one choo•es on th~se 
recent clashes. \\'hate\ er els(' they may mean, 
thry bring Into question the validity of the 
m('a~un-s of military progreSt; which have 
bePn used In ~a!gon Tl1ey bring mto ques-
tion the effectiveness or the Saigon political 
~·ructure, In Its pre ent lt.rm. 'I11ey bring 
Into qu!!6tlon the pnc!!lcntton program 
w hlch nppenrs w ha"' gone the route or at 
le st a dozen prior con tr!ved techniques for 
''winning the people" or VIetnam Tlwy mnke 
clear, finally, that the cities of South V!et-
n :un which have heretofore been spared, 
almost by tacit agreemt>nt, have now bllf'n 
drawn fully Into the vortex of the war's ter-
rible dC\'URtatlon. 
Whatever the outcome of the prc•ent bat-
tles, the baste military problem Is a• It hns 
be<'n from the outset The war remains open-
ended and escnlatron con t!nues to rise wl th 
CS('alat!on, The National Liberation Front 
rl'mnlus onm!prc•sPnt, from the dem!l!tarlzed 
zonp ut'the l?Lh paral l!•l to the southern tip 
of the penhl uln It.~ r('gular forces and guer-
r!lln are obv!ouslv ~tcel<•cl to accept great 
pr! vH t!on and to mn ke enormous sacr!flc!·s. 
The \'let Cong renmin entrenched and vir-
tually untouched In their traditional strong-
holds--the swamps. pacldyfields and hamlets 
or the Mekong Delta from whence they arc 
"blc to dispatch for'rs to r!'!n!orce units 
which, IU! Is nov; npparent. honeycomb 
Sn!gon und other c!t.!es. 
It Is drme:erous to pn'sume thn: ('ither the 
forcl'fl of the JS'at!onal Liberation Front or 
North VIetnam nrc uear!ng the end or the 
rop<'. Actually, Hanoi has committed to the 
war in the South cons rdprabl\ less than a 
q uarter of the forces of General Vo Nguyen 
Glap who rs genernlly credited with master-
mlndtng t ile cu rreHt mil!t.ary strategy In the 
South And beyond North VIetna m lies the 
untapped manpower of China and the supply 
sourcPs of both China and the Sovret Union. 
These nre some or the re~ II t ies which a re 
not measured by the com puters of "progress" 
In Saigon. These are some or the realities 
which seem to me to mnke It Imperative to 
recall the or!g! na I purposes of the American 
commitment to South V!etaam . They were, 
~bovc ali • Isc. limlt·•d purposl's. There Is not 
now nnct there hru- never beE-n n mn.nd~t.e t.o 
take over a war. The commtwncnt Is to sup-
port not to supplant 
At the outse~. It was not an American re-
sponsibility and It Is not now an American 
responsibility to win a victory for any p nr-
t!cular group or VIetnamese or to defeat any 
particular group of VIetnamese. Even If we 
could, It Is not In the Interest.< of this nation 
to synthesize a pol!tlcaJ structure !or South 
VIetnam . That Is not and ought not ever 
to become the !unction of the American 
m111tary command, the American economists. 
administrators, diplomats, political scien-
tists. aid-officials, and others who are 
gathered In VIetnam. The sooner that the 
!un i ts of our commitment are understood by 
nil d!rE'Ctly concerned the better for all con-
crrned 
It Is time to recognize thnt our Immense 
ell'ort has already gone a long way to alter 
the character of what was once an Inner 
struggle among VIetnamese. It ts also time 
to recognize that wh:.tever we may do, the 
future or VIetnam d epends not on us but on 
the VIetnamese themselves. It Is their coun-
try; they live In !t. They will be living In It 
long after we are gone from !t. 
Our res pons!b111ty ls to sustain, not to sub-
merge To strip the VIetnamese struggle o! 
its VIetnamese character, to convert It Into 
a war to be won or lost by this nation, ls to 
detract from Its r('levance both to the people 
or VIetnam nncl to the people or the United 
States. To do so Is to consol!date a.n Ameri-
can involvement on the Southeast Asian 
mainland of Indefinite duration and obscure 
purp<Y"es whose terminus Is not vl~!ble--not 
In VIetnam, not In lAos, or In Cambodia. In-
deed. It may well be an Involvement which 
Is without exit except In World War III. 
Thls nation ls deeply committed In South 
VIetnam but let us not m a ke the mistake 
of Interpreting that commitment as com-
pell!ng us-In the name of victory or what-
ever-to see to It that every last member 
of the NLF Is either dulled, dead, captive. o r 
In !light That course lends not to an ending 
but to an endless succession o! violent be-
ginnings. 
An Inextricable Involvement of American 
forces In VIetnam may meet the needs of 
some but It acrords nei t her with the In-
terest.• of the United Stntes or the people 
of V!etnum In thts connection. President 
Johnson has repeatedly r.ta.ted that thls n a-
tion's objective ts " ... only that the peo-
ple of South VIetnam be allowed to guide 
their own country In their own way." He 
has st..~ted that he ls w1lllng to move at any 
time In negotiations wWch might bring 
about that re>!mlt. He h ns stated that we are 
prepared to move out lock. stock, and barrel 
In a m atter o! mont.hs after a satisfactory 
settlement Is uch!cv Pd . 
lL should be clear, therefore, to all con-
cerned Americans and VIetnamese In Wash-
Ington. In Saigon, and In Hanoi and to 
whomever, wherever- that that Is the accu-
rate measure of this nation's comm!tmeut. 
There Is no obl!gat!on to con t!nue to pour out 
the blood and resources o! this nation until 
South VIetnam Is made safe for one V!et-
n'lmese faction or another. On the con-
trary, t here Is an obl!gatlon to the people 
of the United States to conserve that blOOd 
and those resources and, to the people or 
V!ctnnm, there Is an obllga tlon to a\'Oid the 
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dcdructlon or their Ia nd ~nd society even 
In U1c nnn1c o! saving t.hcnt 
Indeed, ln my judgment, there Is now 
JltUe prospect of meeting Lhese deep obliga-
tions to the people or this nation and to Lhe 
people or VIetnam unless there Is a prompt 
ces.;atlon or the bloodletting and the nego-
ll:ttlon of nn honorable settlement. For that 
ron,on, every possibility of peace must con-
tinue to be explored fully ancl with the ut-
nlo~t.. urgency. 
Tile North VIetnamese have stated that 
t!1ey w111 open negotiations If the bombing 
of the North Is discontinued. I n that con-
nection, It shou ld be noted, first, that the 
bombing has not achieved the purposes ror 
which It was sanctioned. The bom bing has 
not stopped the movement of men and sup-
plies Into the South; on the contrary, the 
rou tcs of Inti! tra tlon carr y a heavier traffic 
than ever before and tbe traffic Includes ever 
more sophisticated weapons. The bombing 
lUIS done little, If anything, for the morale 
or the people of South Vlctnnm and such In -
dications as tbere are, suggest that It has 
done a great den! to strengthen the determi-
nation or the people ot North VIetnam. 
Finally, the bombing has not yet brought 
Hanoi to the conference table, as a suspen-
sion, now. probably will. In short, the bomb-
Ing of the North has added a vast dtmenslon 
to the war. It has ratsed the cost or the war 
ln lives and resources--American and other-
but It has not brought closer-so far as can 
be seen-an honorable end to the conflict. 
It 1s In this context that I have endorsed 
a proposal to confine tbe bombin g to t he 
tnl!Jtratlon routes at the 17th parallel. I t 
may be tnat ln this p roposal, which was ad-
vanced lnltlally by Senator Cooper o! Ken-
tucky----a former Ambassador to India-may 
be found a first step to peace. I am frank to 
state, however, that whlle tbere Is r eason to 
expect an opening or n egotiations I! tbe 
bombing or the North Is curbed, It Is not at 
all certain that negotiations, In turn, wlll 
bring the conflict to an honorable conclusion. 
Negotiations may be futile; they may fall. In 
the end, they may prove no more effective, 
than mllltary escalation has proved to be, In 
brlnglng this war to an acceptable end. 
Indeed, tt Is not ltkely that negotiation• 
Will be fruitful at this time I! the conflict 
Is defined as a stmple, clear-cut case or ag-
gression on the part or the North against 
the South or as some sort o! final test which 
has pitted the forces o! freedom In Vietnam 
In a showdown against Communism. The 
reality In Vietnam Is far more complex, both 
In the relatlonshlps which exist between 
North and South Vietn am and among the 
various groups and elemen ts wit hin South 
Vietnam. How complex , for example, Is In-
dicated by the composition or the present 
government In Saigon. It ts based almost en -
tirely upon a military faction and most or 
Its principals are not Southern VIetnamese 
but Northern VIetnamese. They are clearly 
not the whole coin or poli tical leadership 
In South VIetnam. There are other sources 
o! Indigenous leadership, other groups which 
are without significant voice In the present 
Southern political structure. 
It would be an advance towards peace, In 
my judgment, I! the door to reconciliation 
could be opened among South Vietnamese of 
all political Inclinations. It that Is not to 
be, however, I cannot see that the diplomacy 
or this nation must remain hog-tied by the 
Inflexibility or others. The responsibilities 
which are owed to the people o! this nation 
and VIetnam urge the seeking o! an honor-
able peace, wherever and however It may 
be found and regardless o! who may be 
willing to join In the search. 
It Is possible that tbe divergent fears and 
interests which are lnvol\ed--<llrectly and 
indirectly- In the VIetnamese conflict may 
still be reconcilable on the basis o! the 
Geneva Accords o! 1954 and 1962. These 
agreements mlght still provide a framework 
for d('l.('rtnlning, In pC'n«.c. t.IH' future rcJ:.t-
tlonshlp of the two parts ot VIetnam and 
for r.unrantcclng the urulrnllznt I on of Viet-
nam and of Incloch lnn. 1\ rcnctlvnt.lon of the 
Geneva. Conff'rcnc£', therefore, by the co-
chairmen t.hc United Kingdom and the So-
viet Union-Is clearly desirable Geneva, 
howcvf'r, is not ncccssarlly the only beacon 
of peace and. In any c\ent. It has yet to 
be lit. If the Secretary-General of the United 
Na.Uons, a group of Asian nations, European 
nations, African nations, Communist na-
tions or any combination t.hPrcor were 
prepnr<'d and able. to convene a peace con-
ference, those approaches, too, arc obviously 
wor thy or every consideration. 
The Senate voted a rcsol u tion on Novcn1-
ber 30th last, urging that VIetnam be 
brought a.ctlvely before the Security Council 
of the United Na lions. The proposnl wus 
for a dlre<\t approach to the problem by 
means or tbe open processes or the u .N. 
Charter. 
At the very least, an lnltlaUve In the U.N. 
Secarlty Council would help to clarify the 
significance or the words of p.,.a<:e whlch are 
ralsed on all sides. At the very least, 1 t 
could help to emphasize thls 1at1on's readl-
ness to take Its chances on a 1 eaceful settle-
ment o r the conflict In ac• ord wltb t h e 
world-8.'\llCtlOned premises or the Charter. 
In my judgment, we should and can make 
clear, by procedural vote, that we are willing 
to submit this question of Vletnnm to the 
Security Counctl. We should and can make 
clear, by procedural vote, that we are pre-
pared to Invite any nation or group which 
Is of relevance to a settlement. Inc! udlng 
Hanoi and tbe NLF and Chtna, to participate 
In a race-to-face dlscusslon of the war. We 
should and can make clear, by procedural 
vote, that If the emotions klndled by the con-
filet render undesirable a meeting or t h e 
Security Council In New York, we are pre-
pared to see the Council meet In Geneva or 
anywhere else, as provided for by the Char-
ter. In short, we should and can make 
clear, by votes, that we are willing to follow 
the U.N. path to poace. 
It would seem that nmong the 15 member 
nations o! the Security Council, there ought 
to be found at least the required nine votes 
to respond to an Initiative o! the United 
States, calling !or a U.N. effort to open the 
door to a settlement In VIetnam. 
Nevertheless, It ouch Is not the case, 1 t 
seems desirable to know now. by formal a 1d 
open test, win or Jose, who Is willing and " 10 
Is unwilling to confront the Issue o! peace In 
Vietnam before the bar or the world. May I 
say that It does no service to the United Na -
tions to shrink ! rom brin gin g before It a 
situation which Involves Its f undam ental 
r eason for being. 
On thls point, I would note, too, that the 
members o! the U.N. ought not to overlook 
the obligations or the organization In con-
nection wl th the rising tensions In Koren. 
The U.N. has been Involved- deeply In-
volved- for two decades In Koren. I t was with 
the sanction of the U.N. that this nation car-
ried the main burden or the war which was 
fought In Korea. It was with U.N. guidance 
that the truce In Korea was achieved. It Is 
stlJJ within the competence or the U.N. to 
de'!! with the unresolved questions of Korea, 
and, In particular, when they pose threats 
or renewed war. 
Insofar as this nation's unilateral responsl-
blll ties respecting Korea a re concerned, the 
firm restraint which President Johnson hao 
exercised from the outset In the Pueblo af-
fair, In my judgment, has set a wise course. 
The question Is being pursued quietly at the 
Panmunjom truce site In discussions between 
or representatives and those of North Korea 
Third-party channels are also being explorert: 
In short, the effort at this time Is to seek 
by diplomacy tho release of the crewmen 
allve-I repeat, alive. It Is a prudent course 
ln what Is, at best, a delicate and dangerous 
situation and It deserve; every support. 
Tulks ut P.uununjon nnd t.hc ~cnrd1 for 
t.hlr<l party 1nt' rce8ston, however. do uot 
hPVin tn rxh:-tii!-·L the posslhlllli,..s of solution. 
lf LhC'~f' clfol t.~; cln not. he~r f ruit, othrr op~ 
t.ions mlty nlao be a vntlabl('. T h e P rrsldcn t 
h.as alrcacty had the matter raised at t.he U.N. 
SeC"urlty Council l>y Anlb:t<sador Ql)lf.JIJ' r;.;. If 
rl:"cces:uy. it ran f1 nd should hr p:-Pf..~Pd nnr·w 
In that forum It may be fca.,lt>lr. thrrcby, 
to r:c:-•k nn 1mp:tr~~a1 intc.' tlgatlon. arl' : r:ltion 
or n1edlntlon of the dispute or n pr cseut.:llion 
of the entire m '1tt.C'r to t 1, ... \VcrJd C'ourt 
\Vhatever the spectllc r ecours<'. ill n1v 
judgment, the effor ts to fin d a peaceful •et-
tlement of the P ueblo alTair nre att u n ed to 
this nation's Interest. What m atters, fi rst, Is 
t.he safe release of the crewm en. Whnt m:\t-
tcrs most Is the substan ce n ot th e sh adow 
of this nation's Interests. 
The flare-up In Korea, coming on top o! 
Vl<'tnarn. lndlc·>tcs the hydra-headed po-
tential of war on the Asian continen t. The 
new and dangero11s confrontation In the 
former suggests t he urgen cy or en d ing the 
conlllct on an hon orable ba.~ls In the latter. 
I do not know what the nrospect !or peace 
may be by way of t h e U.N. RJ>proach which 
has been suggested. ObvlouBly, a U.N. ap-
proach cannot be a n y less effective t han t h e 
countless other approach es whtch h ave al -
ready been att empt ed with out success . On 
the other hand, i t m ay not be any m ore 
effective. 
I n any event, somewhere, som ehow, there 
must be the beginnings of a n egot iated set-
tlemen t. Until It Is found, the fires of conflic t 
will bla7e ever m ore fiercely In VIetnam ; 
the arc o! war's wreckage Will continue to 
open on the con tinent or Asia . And I! t he 
fires burn out o r con t rol to World War III, 
what nation will then claim the victory? 
Indeed, what nation will be left to claim It? 
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